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The practice of intergovernmental fiscal
tranfers is the magical art of passing money
from one government to another and seeing it
vanish in thin air.
Anonymous
Abstract
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are a dominant feature of sub-national
finance in most countries.  They are used to ensure that revenues roughly
match the expenditure needs of various orders (levels) of sub-national
governments.  They are also used to advance national, regional and local
area objectives such as fairness and equity and creating a common
economic union. The structure of these transfers create incentives for
national, regional and local governments that have a bearing on fiscal
management, macroeconomic stability, distributional equity, allocative
efficiency and public services delivery.   This paper reviews conceptual,
empirical and the practice literature to distill lessons of policy interest in
designing the fiscal transfers to create the right incentives for prudent
fiscal managment and competitive and innovative service delivery.  The
paper provides practical guidance on the design of performance-oriented
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transfers that emphasize bottom-up, client- focused and results-based
government accountability. It cites examples of simple but innovative
grant designs that can satisfy grantors’ objectives while preserving local
autonomy and creating an enabling environment for responsive,
responsible, equitable and accountable public governance. The paper
further provides guidance on the design and the practice of equalization
transfers for regional fiscal equity as well as the institutional
arrangements for implementation of such transfer mechanisms. 
The paper concludes with negative (practices to avoid) and positive
(practices to emulate) lessons from international practices.     
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers finance about 60 percent of
subnational expenditures in developing countries and transition economies
and about a third of such expenditures in OECD countries (29 percent in the
Nordic countries, 46 percent in non-Nordic Europe). Beyond the
expenditures they finance, these transfers create incentives and
accountability mechanisms that affect the fiscal management, efficiency, and
equity of public service provision and government accountability to citizens. 
This chapter reviews the principles and practices of
intergovernmental finance, with a view to drawing some general lessons of
relevance to policymakers and practitioners in developing countries and
transition economies. It provides a taxonomy of grants, their possible
impacts on local fiscal behavior, and the accountability of grant recipients
to donor governments and citizens. The first section describes the
instruments of intergovernmental finance. Section 2 discusses
performance-oriented, or output-based, transfers, an important tool for
results-based accountability. Section 3 describes the objectives and design
of fiscal transfers in various countries around the world. It shows that in
developing countries and transition economies, fiscal transfers focus
largely on revenue-sharing transfers, with little attention paid to serving
national objectives. It cites examples of simple but innovative grant
designs that can satisfy grantors’ objectives while preserving local
autonomy and creating an enabling environment for responsive,
responsible, equitable and accountable public governance. Section 4
describes institutional arrangements for determining these transfers. The
last section highlights some lessons of relevance to current policy debates
in developing countries and transition economies. It lists practices to avoid
as well as those to emulate in designing and implementing grant programs.
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I. INSTRUMENTS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL FINANCE
Intergovernmental transfers or grants can be broadly classified into
two categories: general-purpose (unconditional) and specific-purpose
(conditional or earmarked) transfers. 
General-Purpose Transfers
General-purpose transfers are provided as general budget support,
with no strings attached. These transfers are typically mandated by law, but
occasionally they may be of an ad hoc or discretionary nature. Such
transfers are intended to preserve local autonomy and enhance
interjurisdictional equity. That is why article 9 of the European Charter of
Local Self Government advocates such transfers by stating: “As far as
possible, grants to local authorities shall not be earmarked for the
financing of specific projects. The provision of grants shall not remove the
basic freedom of local authorities to exercise policy discretion within their
own jurisdiction.” (Barati and Szalai 2000, p.21)
General-purpose transfers are termed bloc transfers when they are
used to provide broad support in a general area of subnational expenditures
(such as education) while allowing recipients discretion in allocating the
funds among specific uses. Bloc grants are a vaguely defined concept.
They fall in the grey area between general-purpose and specific-purpose
transfers, as they provide budget support with no strings attached in a
broad but specific area of subnational expenditures. 
General-purpose transfers simply augment the recipient’s resources.
They have only an income effect as indicated in Figure 1.1 by the shift in
the recipient’s budget line AB upwards and to the right throughout by the
amount of the grant (AC=BD) and the new budget line becomes CD. Since
the grant can be spent on any combination of public goods or services or
used to provide tax relief to residents, general nonmatching assistance
does not affect relative prices (no substitution effect). It is also the least
stimulative of local spending, typically increasing such spending by less
than $0.50 for each additional $1 of unconditional assistance. The
remaining funds are made available as tax relief to local residents to spend
on private goods and services . 
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Figure 1.1
Effect of Unconditional Nonmatching Grant 
Source: Shah (1994)
Conceptually a one dollar increase in local residents’ income should
have exactly the same impact on local public spending as receipt of one
dollar of general purpose transfer. Both tend to shift the budget line outwards
identically. Contrary to this, all empirical studies show that a dollar received
by the community in the form of general purpose grant tends to have a
greater increase in local public spending more than a dollar increase in
residents’ income i.e. the portion of grants retained for local spending tends
to exceed the effective tax rate imposed by local governments on resident’s
incomes (Rosen 2005, Oates 1999, Gramlich 1977; chapter 8 of this
volume). Grant money tends to stick where it first lands, leaving a smaller
than expected fraction available for tax relief, a phenomenon referred to as
the “flypaper effect.” The implication is that for political and bureaucratic
reasons, grants to local governments tend to result in more local spending
than they would have had the same transfers been made directly to local
residents (McMillan, Shah, and Gillen 1980). An explanation for this impact
is provided by the hypothesis that bureaucrats seeks to maximize the size of
their budgets as it gives them greater power and influence in local
community (Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal 1982).
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Formula-based general-purpose transfers are very common. The
federal and state transfers to municipalities in Brazil are examples of
grants of this kind. Evidence suggests that such transfers induce
municipalities to underutilize their own tax bases (Shah, 1991).
Specific-Purpose Transfers 
Specific-purpose, or conditional, transfers are intended to provide
incentives for governments to undertake specific programs or activities.
These grants may be regular or mandatory in nature or discretionary or ad
hoc. 
Conditional transfers typically specify the type of expenditures that
can be financed (input-based conditionality). These may be capital
expenditures, operating expenditures, or both. Conditional transfers may
also require attainment of certain results in service delivery (output-based
conditionality). Input-based conditionality is often intrusive and
unproductive, whereas output-based conditionality can advance grantors’
objectives while preserving local autonomy.
Conditional transfers may incorporate matching provisions –
requiring grant recipients to finance a specified percentage of expenditures
using their own resources. Matching requirements can be either open
ended, meaning that the grantor matches whatever level of resources the
recipient provides, or closed ended, meaning that the grantor matches
recipient funds only up to a pre-specified limit.
Matching requirements encourage greater scrutiny and local
ownership of grant-financed expenditures; closed-ended matching is
helpful in ensuring that the grantor has some control over the costs of the
transfer program. Matching requirements, however,  represent a greater
burden for a recipient jurisdiction with limited fiscal capacity. . In view of
this, it may be desirable to set matching rates in inverse proportion to the
per capita fiscal capacity of the jurisdiction in order to allow poorer
jurisdictions to participate in grant-financed programs. 
Nonmatching Transfers
Conditional nonmatching transfers provide a given level of funds
without local matching, as long the funds are spent for a particular
purpose. Following the grant (=AC), the budget line in Figure 1.2 shifts
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from AB to ACD, where at least OE (=AC) of the assisted public good will
be acquired.
Figure 1.2
Effect of Conditional Nonmatching Grant 
Source: Shah (1994)
Conditional nonmatching grants are best suited for subsidizing
activities considered high priority by a higher-level government but low
priority by local governments. This may be the case if a program generates
a high degree of spillovers up to a given level of provision (OE), after
which the external benefits terminate abruptly. 
For a given level of available assistance, grant recipients prefer
unconditional nonmatching transfers, which provide them with maximum
flexibility to pursue their own objectives. Because such grants augment
resources without influencing spending patterns, they allow recipients to
maximize their own welfare. Grantors, however, may be prepared to
sacrifice some recipient satisfaction to ensure that the funds are directed
toward expenditures on which they place a priority. This is particularly so
when federal objectives are implemented by line agencies or departments
rather than through a central agency, such as the Ministry of Finance, with
a broader mandate. Federal departments do not want local governments to
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shift their program funds toward other areas. In this situation, conditional
(selective) nonmatching (bloc) grants can ensure that the funds are spent
in a department’s area of interest (for example, health care) without
distorting local priorities among alternative activities or inducing
inefficient allocations in the targeted expenditure area. 
Matching Transfers
Conditional matching grants, or cost-sharing programs, require that funds be
spent for specific purposes and that the recipient match the funds to some
degree. Figure 1.3 shows the effect on a local government budget of a 25
percent subsidy program for transportation. AB indicates the no subsidy line
—the combination of transportation and other public goods and services a
city can acquire with a budget of OA = OB. A federal subsidy of 25 percent
of transportation expenditures (that is, a grant of $1 for every $3 of local
funds for spent on transportation) shifts the budget line of attainable
combinations to AC. At any level of other goods and services, the
community can obtain one-third more transportation services. If the
community chooses combination M before the grant, it will likely select a
combination such as N afterward. At N more transportation is acquired.
Figure 1.3 
Effect of Open-Ended Matching Grant
Source: Shah (1994) and McMillan, Shah and Gillen (1980)
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The subsidy has two effects, an income effect and a substitution
effect. The subsidy gives the community more resources, some of which go
to acquiring more transportation services (the income effect). Since the
subsidy reduces the relative price of transportation services, the community
acquires more transportation services from a given budget (the substitution
effect). Both effects stimulate higher spending on transportation.
Although the grant is for transportation, more other public goods
and services may also be acquired, even though they become relatively
more expensive, as a result of the substitution effect. If the income effect
is sufficiently large, it will dominate and the grant will increase
consumption of other goods and services. Most studies find that for grants
of this kind, spending in the specified area increases by less than the
amount of the grant, with the remainder going toward other public goods
and services and tax relief. This is the so-called fungibility effect of grants.
The fungibility of conditional grants depends on both the level of spending
on the assisted public service and the relative priority of such spending.
For example, if the recipient’s own-financed expenditure on the assisted
category exceeds the amount of the conditional grant, the conditionality of
the grant may or may not have any impact on the recipient’s spending
behavior: all, some, or none of the grant funds could go to the assisted
function. Shah (1985, 1988b, 1989) finds that while provincial assistance
to cities in Alberta for public transit was partially diverted to finance other
services, similar assistance for road transportation improvement was not. 
Open-ended matching grants, in which no limit is placed on available
assistance through matching provisions, are well suited for correcting
inefficiencies in the provision of public goods arising from benefit
spillovers, or externalities. Benefit spillovers occur when services provided
and financed by a local government also benefit members of other local
governments that do not contribute to their provision. Because the providing
government bears all the costs but obtains only a portion of the benefits, it
tends to underprovide the goods. If the affected communities cannot
negotiate compensation, the situation can be corrected by a higher
government subsidizing provision of the service, with the extent of the
spillover determining the degree of subsidy or the matching ratio.
Matching grants can correct inefficiencies from spillovers, but they
do not address uneven or inadequate fiscal capacities across state and local
governments. Local governments with ample resources can afford to meet
matching requirements and acquire a substantial amount of assistance.
States with limited fiscal capacities may be unable to match federal funds
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and therefore fail to obtain as much assistance, even though their
expenditure needs may be equal to or greater than those of wealthier states
(Shah 1991). Other forms of assistance are needed to equalize fiscal
capacities in such cases.
Grantors usually prefer closed-ended matching transfers, in which
funds are provided to a certain limit, since such transfers permit them to
retain control over their budgets. Figure 1.4 shows the effect of closed-
ended matching grants on the local budget. AB is the original budget line.
When $1 of assistance is available for every $3 of local funds spent up to
a prespecified limit, the budget line becomes ACD. Initially, costs are
shared on a one-third:two-thirds basis up to a level of OF, at which the
subsidy limit of CG (= CE) is reached. Expenditures beyond OF receive
no subsidy, so the slope of the budget line reverts back to 1:1 rather than
1:3 along the subsidized segment, AC.
Empirical studies typically find that closed-ended grants stimulate
expenditures on the subsidized activity more than open-ended grants
(Gramlich 1977; Shah 1994b; Gamkhar and Shah, 2006). The estimated
response to an additional $1.00 of this kind of grant is typically $1.50.
Institutional factors may explain this surprisingly large response.
Figure 1.4 
Effect of Closed-Ended Matching Grant
Source: Shah (1994)
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Why are conditional closed-ended matching grants common in
industrial countries when they seem ill designed to solve problems and
inefficiencies in the provision of public goods? The answer seems to be
that correcting for inefficiencies is not the sole or perhaps even the primary
objective. Instead, grants are employed to help local governments
financially while promoting spending on activities given priority by the
grantor. The conditional (selective) aspects of or conditions on the
spending are expected to ensure that the funds are directed toward an
activity the grantor views as desirable. This, however, may be false
comfort in view of the potential for fungibility of funds. The local
matching or cost-sharing component affords the grantor a degree of
control, requires a degree of financial accountability by the recipient, and
makes the cost known to the granting government.
Conditional closed-ended matching grants have advantages and
disadvantages from the grantor’s perspective. While such grants may
result in a significant transfer of resources, they may distort output and
cause inefficiencies, since the aid is often available only for a few
activities, causing overspending on these functions while other functions
are underfinanced. If capital outlays are subsidized while operating costs
are not, grants may induce spending on capital-intensive alternatives. 
Conditional open-ended matching grants are the most suitable
vehicles to induce lower-level governments to increase spending on the
assisted function (table 1.1). If the objective is simply to enhance the
welfare of local residents, general-purpose nonmatching transfers are
preferable, as they preserve local autonomy.
To ensure accountability for results, conditional nonmatching
output-based transfers are preferable to other types of transfers. Output-
based transfers respect local autonomy and budgetary flexibility while
providing incentives and accountability mechanisms to improve service
delivery performance. The design of such transfers is discussed in the next
section. 
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II. ACHIEVING RESULTS-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH
PERFORMANCE-ORIENTED TRANSFERS
Economic rationales for output-based grants (used interchangeably
with performance-oriented transfers in this chapter) stem from the
emphasis on contract-based management under the new public
management framework and strengthening demand for good governance
by lowering the transactions costs for citizens in obtaining public services
under the new institutional economics approach. The new public
management framework seeks to strengthen accountability for results by
changing the management paradigm in the public sector from permanent
appointments to contractual appointment and continuation of employment
subject to fulfillment of service delivery contracts. It seeks to create a
competitive service delivery environment by making financing available
on similar conditions to all providers –government and non-government. 
The new institutional economics approach argues that dysfunctional
governance in the public sector results from opportunistic behavior by public
officials, as citizens are either not empowered to hold public officials
accountable for their noncompliance with their mandates and/or for corrupt
acts or face high transactions costs in doing so. In this framework, citizens
are treated as the principals and public officials the agents. The principals
have bounded rationality—they act rationally based on the incomplete
information they have. Acquiring and processing information about public
sector operations is costly. Agents (public officials) are better informed than
principals. Their self-interest motivates them to withhold information from
the public domain, as releasing such information helps principals hold them
accountable. This asymmetry of information allows agents to indulge in
opportunistic behavior which goes unchecked due to high transactions costs
faced by the principals and a lack of or inadequacy of countervailing
institutions to enforce accountable governance. Results-based accountability
through output-based grants empowers citizens by increasing their
information base and lowering their transactions costs in demanding action.
Output-based transfers link grant finance with service delivery
performance. These transfers place conditions on the results to be achieved
while providing full flexibility in the design of programs and associated
spending levels to achieve those objectives. Such transfers help restore
recipients’ focus on the results-based chain (figure 1.5) and the alternate
service delivery framework (competitive framework for public service
delivery) to achieve those results. In order to achieve grant objectives, a
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public manager in the recipient government would examine the results-
based chain to determine whether or not program activities are expected to
yield the desired results. To do so, he or she needs to monitor program
activities and inputs, including intermediate inputs (resources used to
produce outputs), outputs (quantity and quality of public goods and services
produced and access to such goods and services), outcomes (intermediate-
to long-run consequences for consumers/taxpayers of public service
provision or progress in achieving program objectives), impact (program
goals or very long-term consequences of public service provision), and reach
(people who benefit from or are hurt by a program). Such a managerial focus
reinforces joint ownership and accountability of the principal and the agent
in achieving shared goals by highlighting terms of mutual trust. Thus
internal and external reporting shifts from the traditional focus on inputs to
a focus on outputs, reach, and outcomes —in particular, outputs that lead to
results. Flexibility in project definition and implementation is achieved by
shifting emphasis from strict monitoring of inputs to monitoring
performance results and their measurements. Tracking progress toward
expected results is done through indicators, which are negotiated between
the provider and the financing agency. This joint goal setting and reporting
helps ensure client satisfaction on an ongoing basis while building
partnership and ownership into projects (Shah 2005b). 
Figure 1.5 
Applying a Results - Based Chain to Education
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Output-based grants must have conditions on outputs as opposed to
outcomes, as outcomes are subject to influence by factors beyond the control
of a public manager. Public managers should be held accountable only for
factors under their control. Outcome-based conditions diffuse enforcement
of accountability for results. Since the grant conditions are concerned with
service delivery performance in terms of quality of output and access, the
manager is free to choose the program and inputs to deliver results. To
achieve those results, he or she faces positive incentives by grant conditions
that encourage alternate service delivery mechanisms by contracting out,
outsourcing, or simply encouraging competition among government and
nongovernment providers. This can be done by establishing a level playing
field through at par financing, by offering franchises through competitive
bidding, or by providing rewards for performance through benchmarking or
yardstick competition. Such an incentive environment is expected to yield a
management paradigm that emphasizes results-based accountability to
clients with the following common elements:
• Contracts or work program agreements based on pre-specified outputs
and performance targets and budgetary allocations.
• Replacement of lifelong rotating employment with contractual
appointments with task specialization.
• Managerial flexibility but accountability for results.
• Redefinition of public sector role as purchaser but not necessarily
provider of public services.
• Adoption of the subsidiarity principle —that is, public sector decisions
made at the level of government closest to the people, unless a
convincing case can be made not to do so.
• Incentives for cost efficiency.
• Incentives for transparency and competitive service provision.
• Accountability to taxpayers.
Under such an accountable governance framework, grant-financed
budget allocations support contracts and work program agreements, which
are based on prespecified outputs and performance targets. The grant
recipient’s flexibility in input selection —including hiring and firing of
personnel and implementation of programs —is fully respected, but there is
strict accountability for achieving results. The incentive and accountability
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regime created by output-based transfers is expected to create responsive,
responsible, and accountable governance without undermining local
autonomy. In contrast, traditional conditional grants with input
conditionality undermine local autonomy and budgetary flexibility while
reinforcing a culture of opportunism and rent seeking (Table 1.2). 
Table 1.2 
Features of Traditional and Output-Based 
Conditional Grants
Source: Author.
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Output-based grants create incentive regimes that promote a results-
based accountability culture. Consider the case in which the national
government aims to improve access to education by the poor and to
enhance the quality of such education. A common approach is to provide
grants to government schools through conditional grants. These grants
specify the type of expenditures eligible for grant financing (books,
computers, teacher aids, and so forth) as well as financial reporting and
audit requirements. Such input conditionality undermines budgetary
autonomy and flexibility without providing any assurance about the
achievement of results. Moreover, in practice it is difficult to enforce, as
there may be significant opportunities for fungibility of funds. Experience
has shown that there is no one-to-one link between increases in public
spending and improvements in service delivery performance (see Huther,
Roberts, and Shah 1997). 
Output-based design of such grants can help achieve accountability
for results. Under this approach, the national government allocates funds
to local governments based on the size of the school-age population. Local
governments in turn pass these funds on to both government and non-
government providers based on school enrollments. Non-government
providers are eligible to receive grant funds if they admit students based
on merit and provide a tuition subsidy to students whose parents cannot
afford the tuition. All providers are expected to improve or at the minimum
maintain baseline achievement scores on standardized tests, increase
graduation rates, and reduce dropout rates. Failure to do so will invite
public censure and in the extreme case cause grant funds to be
discontinued. In the meantime, reputation risks associated with poor
performance may reduce enrollments, thereby reducing the grant funds
received. Schools have full autonomy in the use of grant funds and are able
to retain unused funds. 
This kind of grant financing would create an incentive environment
for both government and non-government schools to compete and excel to
retain students and establish reputations for quality education, as parental
choice determines grant financing to each school. Such an environment is
particularly important for government schools, where staff have lifelong
appointments and financing is ensured regardless of performance.
Budgetary flexibility and retention of savings would encourage innovation
to deliver quality education. 
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Output-based grants thus preserve autonomy, encourage
competition and innovation, and bring strict accountability for results to
residents. This accountability regime is self-enforcing through consumer
(parental choice in the current example) choice. 
III. DESIGNING FISCAL TRANSFERS: DIVIDING THE SPOILS OR
CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOUNTABLE AND EQUITABLE
GOVERNANCE?
The design of fiscal transfers is critical to ensuring the efficiency
and equity of local service provision and the fiscal health of subnational
governments (for a comprehensive treatment of the economic rationale of
intergovernmental fiscal transfers, see Boadway and Shah forthcoming). A
few simple considerations can be helpful in designing these transfers:
Guidelines for Grant Design
1) Clarity in grant objectives. Grant objectives should be clearly and
precisely specified to guide grant design. 
2) Autonomy. Subnational governments should have complete
independence and flexibility in setting priorities. They should not
be constrained by the categorical structure of programs and
uncertainty associated with decisionmaking at the center. Tax-base
sharing —allowing subnational governments to introduce their own
tax rates on central bases, formula-based revenue sharing, or bloc
grants— is consistent with this objective.
3) Revenue adequacy. Subnational governments should have adequate
revenues to discharge designated responsibilities.
4) Responsiveness. The grant program should be flexible enough to
accommodate unforeseen changes in the fiscal situation of the
recipients. 
5) Equity (fairness). Allocated funds should vary directly with fiscal
need factors and inversely with the tax capacity of each jurisdiction.
6) Predictability. The grant mechanism should ensure predictability of
subnational governments’ shares by publishing five-year
projections of funding availability. The grant formula should
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specify ceilings and floors for yearly fluctuations. Any major
changes in the formula should be accompanied by hold harmless or
grandfathering provisions.
7) Transparency. Both the formula and the allocations should be
disseminated widely, in order to achieve as broad a consensus as
possible on the objectives and operation of the program.
8) Efficiency. The grant design should be neutral with respect to
subnational governments’ choices of resource allocation to different
sectors or types of activity.
9) Simplicity. Grant allocation should be based on objective factors
over which individual units have little control. The formula should
be easy to understand, in order not to reward grantsmanship.
10) Incentive. The design should provide incentives for sound fiscal
management and discourage inefficient practices. Specific transfers
to finance subnational government deficits should not be made.
11) Reach. All grant-financed programs create winners and losers.
Consideration must be given to identifying beneficiaries and those
who will be adversely affected to determine the overall usefulness
and sustainability of the program.
12) Safeguarding of grantor’s objectives. Grantor’s objectives are best
safeguarded by having grant conditions specify the results to be
achieved (output-based grants) and by giving the recipient
flexibility in the use of funds.
13) Affordability. The grant program must recognize donors’ budget
constraints. This suggests that matching programs should be closed
ended. 
14) Singular focus. Each grant program should focus on a single
objective.
15) Accountability for results. The grantor must be accountable for the
design and operation of the program. The recipient must be
accountable to the grantor and its citizens for financial integrity and
results —that is, improvements in service delivery performance.
Citizens’ voice and exit options in grant design can help advance
bottom-up accountability objectives. 
Some of these criteria may be in conflict with others. Grantors may
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therefore have to assign priorities to various factors in comparing design
alternatives (Shah 1994b); Canada 2006).
For enhancing government accountability to voters, it is desirable to
match revenue means (the ability to raise revenues from own sources) as
closely as possible with expenditure needs at all levels of government.
However, higher-level governments must be allowed greater access to
revenues than needed to fulfill their own direct service responsibilities, so
that they are able to use their spending power through fiscal transfers to
fulfill national and regional efficiency and equity objectives. 
Six broad objectives for national fiscal transfers can be identified.
Each of these objectives may apply to varying degrees in different
countries; each calls for a specific design of fiscal transfers. Lack of
attention in design to specific objectives leads to negative perceptions of
these grants (Box 1.1).
Box 1.1 Well-Founded Negative Perceptions of 
Intergovernmental Finance
Perceptions of intergovernmental finance are generally negative. Many
federal officials believe that giving money and power to subnational
governments is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenagers. They
believe that grant monies enable these governments to go on spending
binge and the national government then is faced with the consequences of
their reckless spending behaviors.   Past spending behavior of provincial
and local officials also demonstrates that ‘grant money does not buy
anything’ meaning that it is treated as a windfall gain and wastefully
expended with little to show for in service delivery improvements.
Citizens perceive the granting of intergovernmental fiscal transfers as the
magical art of passing money from one government to another and seeing
it vanish into thin air. 
These perceptions are well grounded in reality in developing countries,
where the primary focus of fiscal transfers is on dividing the spoils. In
developing (and industrial) countries, four types of transfers are common:
• Passing the buck transfers. These are general revenue–sharing
programs that employ multiple factors that work at cross purposes.
Argentina, Brazil, India, the Philippines, and many other countries
have such ongoing programs.
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• Asking for more trouble grants. These are grants that finance
subnational deficits, in the process encouraging higher and higher
deficits. China, Hungary, and India provide this type of grants.
• Pork barrel transfers. In the past politically opportunistic grants
were common in Brazil and Pakistan. They are currently in vogue in
India and Western countries especially the United States of America. 
• Command and control transfers. These are grants with conditions on
inputs. They are used to micromanage and interfere in local
decisionmaking. They are widely practiced in most industrial and
developing countries. 
Source: Author.
Source: Cartoon by Nicholson from The Australian dated November 3, 1997.
www.nicholsoncartoons.com.au
Bridging Vertical Fiscal Gaps
The terms vertical fiscal gap and vertical fiscal imbalance have
been mistakenly used interchangeably in recent literature on fiscal
decentralization. A vertical fiscal gap is defined as the revenue deficiency
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arising from a mismatch between revenue means and expenditure needs,
typically of lower orders of government. A national government may have
more revenues than warranted by its direct and indirect spending
responsibilities; regional and local governments may have less revenues
than their expenditure responsibilities. 
A vertical fiscal imbalance occurs when the vertical fiscal gap is not
adequately addressed by the reassignment of responsibilities or by fiscal
transfers and other means. Boadway (2002b) argues that vertical fiscal
imbalance incorporates an ideal or optimum view of expenditures by
different orders of government and is therefore hard to measure. 
Vertical fiscal gap may arise due to (a) inappropriate assignment of
responsibilities; or (b) centralization of taxing powers; or (c) pursuit of
beggar-thy-neighbor tax policies (wasteful tax competition) by subnational
governments; and (d) lack of tax room at subantional levels due to heavier
tax burdens imposed by the central government. To deal with the vertical
fiscal gap, it is important to deal with its sources through a combination of
policies such as the reassignment of responsibilities, tax decentralization
or tax abatement by the center and tax-base sharing (by allowing
subnational governments to levy supplementary rates on a national tax
base). Only as a last resort should revenue sharing, or unconditional
formula-based transfers, all of which weaken accountability to local
taxpayers, be considered to deal with this gap. Taxation by tax-sharing, as
practiced in China and India, is particularly undesirable, as it creates
incentives for donors to exert less effort in collecting taxes that are shared
than they would collecting taxes that are fully retained. In industrial
countries the fiscal gap is usually dealt with by tax decentralization or tax-
base sharing. Canada and the Nordic countries have achieved harmonized
personal and corporate income tax systems by allowing the central
government to provide tax abatement and subnational governments to
impose supplementary rates on the national tax base. In developing
countries and transition economies, both tax by tax sharing and general
revenue sharing are typically used to deal with the fiscal gap. 
A number of countries, including China, India, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka and South Africa, have in the past, provided deficit grants to fill
fiscal gaps at subnational levels —with unwelcome results in terms of
mushrooming of subnational deficits. These grants are still in vogue in
China, Hungary, and South Africa. 
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Bridging the Fiscal Divide through Fiscal Equalization Transfers
Fiscal equalization transfers are advocated to deal with regional
fiscal equity concerns. These transfers are justified on political and
economic considerations. 
Large regional fiscal disparities can be politically divisive and may
even create threats of secession (Shankar and Shah 2003). This threat is
quite real: since 1975 about 40 new countries have been created by the
break-up of existing political unions. Fiscal equalization transfers could
forestall such threats and create a sense of political participation, as
demonstrated by the impact of such transfers on the separatist movement
in Quebec, Canada. 
Decentralized decisionmaking results in differential net fiscal
benefits (imputed benefits from public spending minus tax burden) for
citizens depending on the fiscal capacities of their place of residence. This
leads to both fiscal inequity and fiscal inefficiency in resource allocation.
Fiscal inequity arises as citizens with identical incomes are treated
differently depending on their place of residence. Fiscal inefficiency in
resource allocation results from people in their relocation decisions
comparing gross income (private income plus net public sector benefits
minus cost of moving) at new locations; economic efficiency
considerations warrant comparing private income minus moving costs
only without any regard to public sector benefits. A nation that values
horizontal equity (the equal treatment of all citizens nationwide) and fiscal
efficiency needs to correct the fiscal inequity and inefficiency that
naturally arise in a decentralized government. Grants from the central
government to states and/or local governments can eliminate these
differences in net fiscal benefits if the transfers depend on the tax capacity
of each state relative to others and on the relative need for and cost of
providing public services. The more decentralized the tax system is, the
greater the need for equalizing transfers. 
The elimination of net fiscal benefits requires a comprehensive
fiscal equalization program that equalizes fiscal capacity (the ability to
raise revenues from own basis using national average tax rates) to a
national average standard and provides compensation for differential
expenditure needs and costs due to inherent cost disabilities rather than
differences that reflect different policies. Some economists argue that if
public sector tax burdens and service benefits are fully capitalized in
property values, the case for fiscal equalization transfers is weaker, as
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residents in rich states pay more for private services and less for public
services and vice versa in poorer states. According to this view, as argued
by Oates (1982), fiscal equalization is a matter of political taste. This view
has gained currency at the federal level in the United States and explains
why there is no federal fiscal equalization program there. In contrast, local
fiscal equalization drives most state assistance to local governments in the
USA, especially school finance (Box 1.2).
Box 1.2  Financing Schools in the United States
U.S. states have taken various approaches to school finance. The states of
Hawaii, Idaho, and Washington fully finance primary and secondary
education. In contrast, New Hampshire covers only 9 percent of school
finance. 
Delaware and North Carolina finance education through bloc grants that
are indexed to population, GDP, and inflation growth rates. The grants
are derived by calculating equal amounts per unit based on the number
of students, teachers, classrooms, courses, classes, and other factors. The
units can be standardized using various yardsticks, such as class size and
teacher: pupil ratios. Various measures of students, including enrollment,
average daily attendance, enrollment weighted by grades, types of
programs, and number of students with special needs, are used. 
Other states use equalization grants, including foundation grants,
percentage equalization grants, and district power equalization grants. 
Foundation grants vary inversely with the fiscal capacity of a school
board. The grant allocation is based on an application of the representative
tax system approach to fiscal capacity equalization per student across
school districts. The following formula is used:
foundation grant = (maximum per student grant – own school
district contribution per student based on mandated minimum tax
rate applied to per student tax base) x enrollment
Forty-two states have adopted variants of this approach, with 22 states
specifying the minimum mandated tax rate. Various measures are used to
determine enrollment, including the number of students on the rolls on a
specified date, average daily attendance, and average attendance over a
period. Most states (36) use a scheme that weights enrollment by grade,
program, and student disabilities. 
149A Practitioner’s Guide to Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers
Rhode Island uses a percentage equalization grant —a matching cum
equalization grant for school spending based on the following formula:
grant per student = [1– matching rate x (per capita tax capacity in
the district/ state average district tax capacity per capita)] x district
spending per capita 
District power equalization grants, used in Indiana and Washington,
include incentives for increased tax effort in an equalizing grant. The
formula used is:
grant = (per capita average fiscal capacity – per capita fiscal
capacity of the district) x district tax rate 
Source: Vaillancourt (1998). 
Conceptually, full capitalization requires a small open area with
costless mobility. Most federations and even states in large countries do not
fulfill this condition. As a result, criticism of fiscal equalization using the
capitalization argument may have only weak empirical support (Shah,
1988a). 
In principle, a properly designed fiscal equalization transfers
program corrects distortions that may cause fiscally induced migration by
equalizing net fiscal benefits across states. A reasonable estimate of the
costs and benefits of providing public services in various states is essential
to measure net fiscal benefits. Measures of differential revenue-raising
abilities and the needs and costs of providing public services in different
states must be developed. Equalization of net fiscal benefits could then be
attempted by adopting a standard of equalization and establishing the
means of financing the needed transfers. 
Measuring Fiscal Capacity
Estimating fiscal capacity —the ability of governmental units to
raise revenues from their own sources— is conceptually and empirically
difficult. The two most common ways of doing so are with
macroeconomic indicators and the representative tax system.
Various measures of income and output serve as indicators of the
ability of residents of a state to bear tax burdens. Among the better known
measures are the following: 
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• State gross domestic product (GDP). State GDP represents the total
value of goods and services produced within a state. It is an imperfect
guide to the ability of a state government to raise taxes, since a
significant portion of income may accrue to nonresident owners of
factors of production. For example, the Northern Territory has the
highest per capita income in Australia, but it is treated as the poorest
jurisdiction in federal-state fiscal relations. 
• State factor income. State factor income includes all income —capital
and labor— earned in the state. It makes no distinction between income
earned and income retained by residents.
• State factor income accruing to residents only. This measure represents
a more useful measure, provided states are able to tax factor income. 
• State personal income. The sum of all income received by residents of
a state is a reasonable measure of the state’s ability to bear tax burdens.
It is an imperfect and partial measure of the ability to impose tax
burdens, however, and therefore not a satisfactory measure of overall
fiscal capacity.
• Personal disposable income. Personal disposable income equals
personal income minus direct and indirect taxes plus transfers. This
concept is subject to the same limitations affecting personal income.
In general, macro measures do not reflect the ability of subnational
governments to raise revenues from own sources. Boadway argues
against the use of macro indicators in an equalization formula on the
grounds that a macro formula “ignores the fact that fiscal inefficiency and
fiscal inequity are the products of the actual mix of taxes chosen by
provincial governments” (Boadway, 2002a, 12). This neglect runs the risk
of violating the principles of equalization itself. A second major difficulty
in the use of macro indicators is the availability of accurate and timely
data at subnational levels. Such data become available only with
significant lags, and the accuracy of such data may be questionable. Use
of these data may therefore invite controversy (see Aubut and
Vaillancourt 2001 for a Canadian illustration of this point). Despite these
problems, both Brazil and India use macro indicators in their federal-state
revenue-sharing programs. 
The representative tax system approach measures the fiscal capacity
of a state by the revenue that could be raised if the government employed all
of the standard sources at the nationwide average intensity of use.
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Estimating equalization entitlements using the representative tax system
requires information on the tax bases and tax revenues for each state. Fiscal
capacity of the have-not states is brought up to the median, mean, or other
norm. Using the mean of all states as a standard, the state equalization
entitlement for a revenue source is determined by the formula:
where Ei is the equalization entitlement of state x from revenue
source i, POP is population, PCTBi is the per capita tax base of revenue
source i, ti is the national average tax rate of revenue source i, subscript na
is the national average, and subscript x is state x. The equalization
entitlement for a state from a particular revenue source can be negative,
positive, or zero. The total of these values indicates whether a state
receives a positive or negative entitlement from the interstate revenue-
sharing pool. Since data on major tax bases and tax collections required to
implement representative tax system are usually published regularly by
various levels of government, the representative tax system does not
impose new data requirements and can be readily implemented in
countries that have decentralized taxing responsibility to subnational
levels, as most transition economies do. Of course, implementing such a
system will not be feasible in countries with limited tax decentralization
(very large vertical fiscal gaps) or poor tax administration. 
Measuring Expenditure Needs
The case for fiscal equalization rests on eliminating different net
fiscal benefits across states that give rise to fiscally induced migration.
Such differential net fiscal benefits can arise as a result of decentralization
of taxing authority and decentralized public expenditures. Differences in
the demographic composition of the population across jurisdictions will
result in differential needs for decentralized public services, such as
education, health and social welfare. Differences in age distribution affect
the need for schools, hospitals, and recreational facilities. Differences in
the incidence of poverty and disease may affect the need for education,
training, health, social services, and transfer payments. Jurisdictions with
higher need factors would have greater need for revenues to provide
comparable levels of public services at comparable levels of taxation.
These need differentials are likely to cause substantial variations across
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jurisdictions in the level and mix of public goods provided, resulting in
different net fiscal benefits A strong case for equalization can be
established on grounds of efficiency and equity to compensate for need
differentials that give rise to different net fiscal benefits.
The fiscal federalism literature treats differential costs as synonymous
with differential needs, but some cost differences may arise from deliberate
policy decisions by subnational governments rather than differences in need.
Boadway (2004) argues that even for inherent cost disadvantages, such as
differences between urban and rural areas, the equity advantage of more
equal provision must be weighed against the efficiency costs. If it is more
costly to deliver public services in rural areas than urban areas, it is
inefficient for an equalization program to neutralize these cost differences.
Even in unitary states, the level of public services in remote, rural, or
mountainous areas is usually lower than in more densely populated urban
areas. Under a decentralized fiscal system, a policy choice must be made
about minimum standards, but there is no justification for providing the same
level of services in remote and urban areas, as the Australian fiscal need
equalization program does. Instead, as Boadway suggests, one could stratify
locations in all regions by their costs and equalize across regions within
comparable strata. Equalization grants should partially offset only inherent
disabilities, disregarding cost differences that reflect deliberate policy
decisions or differences in the efficiency with which resources are used. 
In practice, expenditure need is more difficult to define and derive than
fiscal capacity. The difficulties include defining an equalization standard;
understanding differences in demographics, service areas, populations, local
needs, and policies; and understanding strategic behavior of recipient states.
Despite these formidable difficulties, numerous attempts have been made to
measure expenditure need. The approaches can be broadly classified into
three main categories: (a) ad hoc determination of expenditure needs, (b)
representative expenditure system using direct imputation methods, and (c)
the theory-based representative expenditure system.
(a) Ad hoc determination of expenditure needs uses simple
measures of expenditure needs in general-purpose transfers. The factors
used and their relative weights are arbitrarily determined. Germany uses
population size and population density adjustments, China uses the
number of public employees, India uses measures of backwardness. 
The Canadian provinces use simple measures of expenditure need
in their general-purpose transfers to municipalities These include
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population size, population density, population growth factors, road
length, number of dwelling units, location factors (such as northern
location), urbanization factors (primary urban population and urban/rural
class) and social assistance payments (see Shah 1994b). The most
sophisticated of these approaches is the one taken by Saskatchewan, where
the standard municipal expenditure of a class of municipalities is assumed
to be a function of the total population of the class. Regression analysis is
used to derive a graduated standard per capita expenditure table for
municipal governments by population class. 
An interesting example of the application of this approach is South
Africa’s use of it in its equitable share transfers to the provinces (South
Africa 2006). The equitable share formula applicable for 2006–08 focuses
almost entirely on need factors, with only a 1 percent weight given to
negative needs (per capita GDP). The formula uses the following shares:
• A basic share (14 percent weight) is derived from each province’s share
of the national population.
• An education share (51 percent) is based on the size of the school-age
population (5–17) and the average number of learners (grades R–12)
enrolled in public ordinary schools over the past three years.
• A health share (26 percent) is based on the proportion of the population
with and without access to medical aid.
• An institutional component (5 percent) is divided equally among the
provinces.
• A poverty component (3 percent) is based on incidence of poverty. 
• An economic output component (1 percent) is based on data on GDP
by region. 
(b) The representative expenditure system using direct imputation
methods seeks to create a parallel system to the representative tax system on
the expenditure side. This is done by dividing subnational expenditures into
various functions, determining total expenditures by each jurisdiction for
each function, identifying relative need/cost factors, assigning relative
weights using direct imputation methods or regression analysis, and
allocating total expenditures of all jurisdictions on each function across
jurisdictions on the basis of their relative costs and needs for each function
(see table 1.3 for a compilation of need factors used in industrial countries). 
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The advantage of this approach is that it obviates the need for the very
elaborate calculations and assumptions needed to quantify the provision of
services at some defined level. It does so by using the sum of actual total
expenditures as the point of departure for measuring expenditure needs,
reducing the problem to one of allocating total need among subnational
governments on the basis of selected indicators of need, including proxies
for need if desired. The disadvantage of this approach is that it does not
necessarily exclude expenses incurred by any of the provinces that go
beyond the concept of a “reasonable level of public service”. However, the
approach can be adjusted to exclude identifiable excesses from total
expenditures (for example gold standards for some services or relatively
unafforadble benefits provided by some rich states) in respect of which
needs are to be allocated.
A sophisticated variant of this methodology is used by the
Commonwealth Grants Commission of Australia, which defines
expenditure as the cost of supplying average performance levels for the
existing mix of state-local programs. Relative expenditure needs are then
determined empirically using direct imputation methods for 41 state-local
expenditures. The following hypothetical example illustrates the treatment
of welfare expenditures using a crude approach similar to that used by the
Commonwealth Grants Commission for establishing expenditure needs
under a representative expenditure system. 
Assume that there are 10 states in Grantland, that the unit costs of
welfare are equal in all states, and that needs for welfare vary based on the
percentage of the working-age population that is unemployed, the
percentage of the population that is not of working age, and the percentage
of families with a single parent. The independent grants commission
assigns a 40 percent weight to the percentage of the working-age population
that is unemployed, a 35 percent weight to the percentage of the population
that is not of working age, and a 25 percent weight to the percentage of
families with a single parent. Assume that expenditures by all states for
welfare total $5 billion and that state A accounts for 4.8 percent of the 10-
state total for the first factor, 3.0 percent of the total for the second factor,
and 2.2 percent of the total for the third factor. State A’s estimated need for
a standard level of welfare expenditure would then equal: 
$5 billion x (0.048 x 0.40) + (0.03 x 0.35) + (0.022 x 0.25) = $176
million, or 3.2 percent of all state expenditures. 
Shah (1994a) provides an application of the approach using
provincial-local expenditure functions for Canada and uses quantitative
analysis in selection and weighting of factors for various l expenditure
functions (see Table 1.4). 
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Table 1.4
Weighting of factors for provincial-local 
expenditure functions for Canada
Note: Calculations based on regression coefficients. The use of a variable prefixed by I means 
that a relative index of the variable is used.  
Source: Shah (1994a)
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This approach is highly subjective and therefore potentially
controversial. Recent experience in Australia vividly demonstrates the
problems that arise if such an approach is followed in practice as discussed
in the following section. Some subjectivity and imprecision can be
alleviated by using quantitative analysis in choosing factors and weights,
as Shah suggests (1994a). 
(c) The Theory-based representative expenditure system. The
representative expenditure system can be significantly improved using a
conceptual framework that embodies appropriately defined concept of
fiscal need and properly specified expenditure functions that are estimated
using objective quantitative analysis, as proposed by Shah (1996) for
Canada. Under this refined approach, the so-called the theory-based
representative expenditure system,  the equalization entitlement from
expenditure category i equals the per capita potential expenditure of state
A for category i based on own need factors if it had national average fiscal
capacity minus per capita potential expenditure of state A on expenditure
category i if it had national average need factors and national average
fiscal capacity. 
This approach is even more difficult to implement than the less
refined approach, but it has the advantage of objectivity and it enables the
analyst to derive measures based on actual observed behavior rather than
ad hoc value judgments. The relative weights assigned to various need
factors and their impact on allocation of grant funds are determined by
econometric analysis. Furthermore, this approach yields both the total pool
and the allocation of fiscal need equalization grants among recipient units.
This method requires specifying determinants for each service category,
including relevant fiscal capacity and public service need variables. A
properly specified regression equation yields quantitative estimates of the
influence each factor has in determining spending levels of a category of
public service. This information can be analyzed to determine what each
state would actually have spent if it had national average fiscal capacity
and but actual need factors. This then can be compared to the standard
expenditure for each service based upon an evaluation of the same
equation for determining what each state would have spent if it had the
national average fiscal capacity and also national average need factors.
The sum of differences of these two expressions for all expenditure
categories would determine whether or not the state had more (if sum was
positive) or less than the average needs (if sum was negative) (see Shah
1996 for a Canadian application of this approach). 
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The formula for equalization entitlement based on expenditure
classification i for state x could be stated as follows:
EEix = (POP) x [(PCSE)ix – (PCSE) ina]
where EEix is the equalization entitlement for expenditure
classification i for state x, POPx is the population of state x, PCSEix is the
per capita standardized expenditure by state x on expenditure classification
i (or the estimated amount the state would have spent to meet actual needs
if it had national average fiscal capacity), and PCSE ina is the national
average per capita standardized expenditure for classification i. This is the
estimated expenditure for all states, based on national average values of
fiscal capacity and need. The equalization entitlement for a particular
expenditure classification could be positive, negative, or zero. The total of
these entitlements in all expenditure categories is considered for
equalization.
A comprehensive system of equalization determines the overall
entitlement of a state by considering its separate entitlements from the
representative tax system and the representative expenditure system. Only
states with positive net entitlements are eligible for transfers of all or some
fraction of the total amount, with the fraction determined by the central
government based on the availability of funds.
Practical Difficulties in Equalizing Expenditure Needs: Australia’s
Experience 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission of Australia found the
theory-based representative expenditure system approach difficult to
implement. It opted instead for an alternate representative expenditure
system using direct imputation methods that simply equalizes what all
states on average actually spend. The Australian system seeks absolute
comparability for all 41 state-local services rather than just merit goods
(some would question whether this is worth pursuing). 
Australia’s approach raises several questions. Is equal access to all
services in remote areas desirable at any cost? If a rich state decides to buy
limousines for its officials, or make higher welfare payments to its
aboriginal population, why should equalization payments to poorer states
go up? Such an approach diverts states’ energies to demonstrate that they
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“need more to do less” or “money does not buy much” as opposed to
“doing more with less” as higher spending is rewarded and cost-saving in
delivering improved services is discouraged by the equalization grant
formula. Such a system rewards some bad behaviors, including excessive
use of some services by specific groups, tax expenditures by states to
attract capital and labor, and state assumption of contingent and non-
contingent liabilities. 
In addition to conceptual difficulties, the Australian program is
plagued with measurement problems. The determinants of expenditure
needs for various expenditure categories are arrived at based on broad
judgments. Arbitrary procedures are used to derive factor weights and
combine various factors into functional forms. State disabilities stemming
from various factors are multiplied. For highly correlated factors,
disabilities are artificially magnified through double counting and
multiplication. The Australian experience highlights the practical
difficulties associated with implementing fiscal need compensation as part
of a comprehensive fiscal equalization approach (see Shah 2004). 
Conclusions regarding the Practice of Fiscal Need Equalization 
Fiscal capacity equalization is relatively straightforward to
comprehend and feasible (with some difficulty) to implement once a
(political) decision is made on the standard of equalization. Fiscal need
equalization is a complex and potentially controversial proposition, because
by its very nature it requires making subjective judgments and using
imprecise analytical methods. An analytical approach such as regression
analysis using historical data is inappropriate when underlying structures are
subject to change due to technology and other dynamic considerations. Great
care is needed to specify determinants of each service. 
Australia’s Commonwealth Grants Commission makes these
calculations using broad judgments and sampling services. With the single
exception of the Northern Territory, which has a large aboriginal population,
there is little cross-state variations in the expenditure needs of the Australian
states. A special grant for the Northern Territory would simplify the
Australian program while achieving its equalization objectives. 
Very few countries opt for a comprehensive program of fiscal
equalization. In contrast, a few industrial countries use fiscal capacity
equalization programs, both at the federal-state (Canada, Switzerland) and
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state-local levels (Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark). Fiscal need
compensation is important, but for the sake of simplicity and objectivity,
rather than implement a fiscal need equalization approach as part of the
fiscal equalization program, it may be better instead to achieve fiscal needs
compensation on a service by service basis through output-based national
minimum standards grants. South Africa, however, as discussed earlier,
does not use output-based transfers and instead compensates for fiscal
needs on a service-by-service basis in determining provincial entitlements
for central general-purpose grants to the provinces. 
Frequently Encountered Concerns in Designing Equalization Transfers 
The most frequently encountered concerns in designing
equalization transfers include: defining  the equalization standard,
whether or not to include tax efforts provisions, how to ensure stability and
forestalling strategic behaviors to qualify for higher level of transfers.
These issues are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Equalizing net fiscal benefits requires an explicit standard of
equalization —the level to which each state is entitled to be raised to
provide public sector net benefits per household that are comparable to
other states. Simplicity dictates choosing either the mean or the median of
the governmental units involved as the standard. The mean provides a
good representation of the data as long as outliers are not present. If
sample values have a wide range, the median, or the mean after
eliminating outliers, provides a better representation of the sample. The
mean is preferable to the median, however, for ease of computation. 
An ideal fiscal equalization program is self-financing. Member
governments are assessed, as in Germany, positive and negative
entitlements that total zero, with the federal government acting as a
conduit. If an interstate equalization pool creates administrative
difficulties, the equalization program can be financed out of general
federal revenues, as done in Canada, derived in part from the states
receiving equalization.
There is general consensus in the academic literature that an
equalization system should enable state governments to provide a standard
package of public services if the government imposes a standard level of
taxes on the bases at its disposal. State governments or their citizens
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should, however, be permitted to substitute lower rates of taxation for
lower levels of services. In such cases, the equalization payments should
be in the form of unconditional grants, which have only income effects.
Service areas in which there is a good reason to set minimum national
standards are better handled by output-based conditional grants and
shared-cost programs. By raising a state’s fiscal capacity, unconditional
equalization grants enable poorer states to participate in shared-cost
programs more easily.
Incorporating tax effort into the formula for determining
equalization involves making the equalization entitlement a function of the
ratio of actual tax collections in a state to the state’s base. Potential
nonrecipient states may wish to see such a factor incorporated into the
program to prevent states with a positive fiscal deficiency in an area from
collecting equalization payments even if they may not levy a tax in the
area. Potential recipient states may wish to see tax effort incorporated
because without it, extra tax effort on their part will be relatively
unproductive compared with a wealthy state. 
Several problems exist with incorporating tax effort into the program:
• The inclusion of tax effort will cause the program to depart from its
unconditional nature. A state should be free to substitute grant funds for
revenue from own sources.
• If a state raises taxes to provide a package of services that is more
costly than the standard, it should not receive equalization for doing so;
other states should not have to pay most of the cost if a state decides to
paint its roads.
• Incorporating tax effort ties the federal government to the expenditure
philosophies of the various states.
• Some states do not have tax bases in all areas.
• Incorporating tax effort may encourage the employment of strategy by
a state.
• In view of the different abilities of the states to export taxes, the
measurement of tax effort would be crude.
• Incorporating tax effort could result in an increase in taxes on the poor
states.
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In view of these considerations, including tax effort would not
improve a program of equalization payments.
If equalization payments are based on relative measures of fiscal
capacity, they should have a stabilizing effect on state revenues. The level
of payments will move in the opposite direction of states’ own revenue-
raising capacity. Maximum stabilization of state-local revenues will occur
when payments are based on all revenue sources, a national average
standard of equalization is used, cyclical fluctuations in provincial
economies are small, and the time lag in calculating the grants is relatively
short. When any large component of the total base, such as natural
resource revenues, is volatile, the destabilizing effects can be large. In this
case, some sort of averaging formula should be used to ease difficulties
associated with provincial budgeting in the face of uncertainty.
Strategy refers to action provincial/state governments can take to
influence the level of payments they receive. A program that enables a
state to employ strategy is undesirable, because in general the extra
payments received may not have any relation to actual disparities. For
example, a program employing tax effort could enable states to raise their
entitlements by imposing heavy taxes in areas in which they have a tax
base below the national average. This problem is less serious in practice
than one might expect, since room for additional taxation from sources in
which the potential have-not states are not well endowed is extremely
limited.
Reflections on Comparative Practices of Fiscal Equalization Transfers
A small but growing number of industrial countries and transition
economies have introduced fiscal equalization programs. These include
Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, Germany, Indonesia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, and
Ukraine. All equalization programs are concerned with interjurisdictional
equity or horizontal fiscal equity, not interpersonal (vertical) equity. Which
level of government finances and administers an equalization program is
determined either by the constitution (as in Canada, Germany, and
Switzerland) or by the legislature (as in Australia) (Table 1.5). 
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Table 1.5
Features of Fiscal Equalization Transfers in Selected Countries
Source: Author.
Paternal programs, in which higher-level governments finance
equalization at lower levels are common (examples include Australia and
Canada). Fraternal or Robin Hood–type (Robin Hood stole from the rich to
give to the poor) programs, in which governments at the same level
establish a common pool, to which rich jurisdictions contribute and the
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poor jurisdictions draw, are rare (exceptions include Germany at the Länder
level and Denmark at the local level). Robin Hood programs are preferred,
as they represent an open political compromise balancing the interests of
the union and the contributing jurisdictions, as done by the Solidarity Pact
II in Germany. Such programs foster national unity, as poorer jurisdictions
clearly see the contributions made for their well-being by residents of other
jurisdictions. Paternal programs lack the discipline of fraternal programs,
because unless enshrined in the constitution (as in Canada), they are guided
largely by national politics and the budgetary situation of the federal and
state/provincial (for local equalization) governments. 
Some countries combine both Robin Hood (fraternal) and paternal
components in their grant programs. In Switzerland, effective 2007,  the
federal government finances two-thirds of the program, with the remaining
third financed by the rich cantons. The program has a fiscal capacity
equalization component based on factor income, with 59 percent of the
financing from the federal government and 41 percent from rich cantons.
The cost equalization component is financed solely by the federal
government. The German equalization program has a small supplementary
component financed solely by the federal government. In Denmark
equalization at the local level uses the Robin Hood approach for both fiscal
capacity and fiscal need equalization for counties (using 85 percent national
average standard) and large cities (90 percent and 60 percent of national
average standards for fiscal capacity and fiscal need respectively ); for
smaller municipalities, it uses the paternal approach for fiscal capacity
equalization (using 50 percent of national average standard as the standard
of equalization) and the Robin Hood approach for fiscal need equalization
(using 35 percent of the national average as the standard of equalization). 
Fiscal equalization programs also differ in terms of how the total
pool of resources devoted to such programs is determined. In the Canadian
and German programs, both the total pool and its allocation to
provinces/states are formula driven. Under the Australian and Swiss
programs, the total pool is arbitrarily determined by the federal
government through an act of parliament —total proceeds of the general
sales tax in Australia and an arbitrarily determined level of funding from
the federal government and rich cantons in Switzerland. 
The method of equalization also differs across programs. Australia,
Canada, and Germany equalize per capita fiscal capacity using the
representative tax system; Switzerland uses macro tax bases. It devotes 19
percent of equalization financing to cost equalization using eight factors:
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population size, area, population density, population older than 80, number
of large cities, number of foreign adults resident for more than 10 years,
unemployment, and number of people requesting social assistance from the
canton. In Germany actual rather than potential revenues are used in these
calculations, as both actual and potential revenues are the same due to the
uniformity of state tax bases and tax rates through federal legislation. It
makes simple expenditure need adjustments based on population size,
density and for harbour cities. China uses potential revenues although they
equal actual revenues, when there is uniformity of tax bases and tax rates
as mandated by central government legislation there. The Canadian
program does not include fiscal need compensation. Australia uses a
comprehensive equalization program, equalizing fiscal capacity as well as
need for all state expenditures. Introduction of expenditure needs
compensation introduces complexity and controversy and dilutes political
consensus. As a result, the Australian program is the most complex and
controversial of all programs and has garnered the least political consensus.
Most equalization programs are introduced as permanent programs;
an exception is Canada, where there is a sunset clause for quinquennial
review and renewal by the national parliament. Such a clause is helpful in
providing a regular periodic evaluation and fine-tuning of the system.
Almost all programs in mature federations specify formal mechanisms for
resolving disputes regarding the working of these transfers programs. 
Overall, the experience of mature federations with fiscal
equalization suggests that in the interest of simplicity, transparency, and
accountability, it would be better for such programs to focus only on fiscal
capacity equalization to an explicit standard that determines the total pool
as well as the allocation among recipient units. Fiscal need compensation
is best dealt with through specific-purpose transfers for merit goods, as is
done in most industrial countries. 
Most transition economies have equalization components in their
grant programs to subnational governments. China, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have adopted
transfer formulas that explicitly incorporate either fiscal capacity and/or
expenditure need equalization concerns. For local fiscal equalization, these
countries nevertheless use one size fits all approaches to diverse forms of
local government, creating equity concerns. 
With the exception of Indonesia, developing countries have not
implemented programs using explicit equalization standards, although
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equalization objectives are implicitly attempted in the general revenue-
sharing mechanisms used in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Nigeria,
Mexico, Pakistan, and South Africa. These mechanisms typically combine
diverse and conflicting objectives into the same formula and fall
significantly short on individual objectives. Because the formulas lack
explicit equalization standards, they fail to address regional equity
objectives satisfactorily. Even in the Indonesian program total pool is not
determined by an explicit equalization standard and instead equalization
standard is implicitly determined by the ad hoc determination of total
funds available for equalization purposes. 
Setting National Minimum Standards
Setting national minimum standards in regional-local services may
be important for two reasons. First, there is an advantage to the nation as
a whole from such standards, which contribute to the free flow of goods,
services, labor, and capital; reduce wasteful interjurisdictional expenditure
competition; and improve the gains from trade from the internal common
market. Second, these standards serve national equity objectives. Many
public services provided at the subnational level, such as education, health,
and social welfare, are redistributive in their intent, providing in kind
redistribution to residents. In a federal system, lower-level provision of
such services —while desirable for efficiency, preference matching, and
accountability— creates difficulty fulfilling federal equity objectives.
Factor mobility and tax competition create strong incentives for lower-
level governments to underprovide such services and to restrict access to
those most in need, such as the poor and the old. Attempts to exclude those
most in need are justified by their greater susceptibility to disease and
potentially greater risks for cost curtailment. Such perverse incentives can
be alleviated by conditional nonmatching grants, in which the conditions
reflect national efficiency and equity concerns and there is a financial
penalty associated with failure to comply with any of the conditions.
Conditions are thus imposed not on the specific use of grant funds but on
attainment of standards in quality, access, and level of services. Such
output-based grants do not affect local government incentives for cost
efficiency, but they do encourage compliance with nationally specified
standards for access and level of services. Properly designed conditional
nonmatching output-based transfers can create incentives for innovative
and competitive approaches to improved service delivery. Input-based
grants fail to create such an accountability environment. 
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With a few exceptions, noted below, both industrial and developing
countries typically do not use output-based transfers for fiscal need
compensation in sectoral grants. However, industrial countries typically keep
the design of input-based conditional sectoral grants simple, using relatively
simple demographic factors. In contrast, developing countries opt for
complex formulas, using state of the art quantitative techniques (table 1.6).
A good illustration of a simple but effective output-based grant
system is the Canadian Health Transfers program by the Federal
Government of Canada. The program has enabled Canadian provinces to
ensure universal access to high-quality health care to all residents
regardless of their income or place of residence. 
Under this program the federal government provides per capita
transfers for health to the provinces, with the rate of growth of the transfers
tied to the rate of growth of GDP. No conditions are imposed on spending,
but strong conditions are imposed on access to health care. As part of the
agreement to receive transfers from the federal government, the provinces
undertake to abide by several access-related conditions: 
1. Universality: All residents enjoy the same coverage.
2. Portability: Residents who move to another province retain health
coverage in the province of origin for a transition period. Residents
and nonresidents have equal access.
3. Public insurance but public/private provision: The province agrees
to provide universal insurance to all. Both public and private
providers are reimbursed from the public insurance system using
the same schedule of payments, negotiated by the provincial
medical association.
4. Opting in and opting out: Providers participating in the system
cannot bill patients directly but are reimbursed by the province. All
health care providers can opt out of the system, billing patients
directly and not following the prescribed fee schedule. Patients of
these providers are reimbursed according to a government schedule
of payments by submitting claims.
5. No extra billing: Charges in excess of the prescribed schedule are
not permitted by providers opting in the system. 
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Table 1.6
Need Factors Used for Grant Financing of
Health Care in Selected Countries
Source: World Bank (2006).
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Breaches in any of these conditions results in penalties. If any of
the first four conditions is breached, grant funding can be terminated. If
the last condition is breached, grant funds are reduced on a dollar for
dollar basis. 
Developing countries and transition economies rarely use
conditional nonmatching output-based transfers to ensure national
minimum standards in merit goods or fiscal need compensation. There are
nevertheless a few shining examples of programs that marry equity with
performance orientation in grant allocation. These include central
government transfers to provincial and local governments for primary
education and transportation in Indonesia (discontinued in 2001); per
pupil grants to all schools and a 25 percent additional grant as salary
bonus for teachers in the best performing schools in Chile (Gonzalez
2005) and central grants to municipal governments to subsidize water and
sewer use by the poor in Chile (Gomez-Lobo, 2002), central per capita
transfers for education in Colombia and South Africa, and federal per
pupil grants to states for secondary education and to municipalities for
primary education in Brazil (Gordon and Vegas 2004). 
Indonesian pre-2001 education and road maintenance grants to
districts are examples of good grant design. The operating grant for
schools in Indonesia used school-age population (7–12) as the criterion
for distributing funds to district and town governments. These operating
grants were supplemented by a matching capital grant for school
construction (local government matching in the form of land for school)
to achieve minimum standards of access to primary schooling – having
primary school within walking distance to each community. The grants
enabled Indonesia to achieve remarkable success in improving literacy
and achieving minimum standards of access to primary education across
the nation. 
The Indonesian District/Town Road Improvement Grant (pre-
2001) used length of roads, condition, density (traffic use), and unit costs
as criteria for distributing funds. This grant program helped monitor the
health of the road network on a continuing basis and kept roads in good
working conditions in most jurisdictions (Shah 1998). 
In Chile and the State of Michigan in the United States, school
grants finance vouchers for school-age children, giving parents choice in
sending their children to public, private, or parochial schools. An
additional performance grant of 25 percent is available to the best
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performing schools, for use as salary bonus to teachers in Chile. Grants to
municipal governments in Chile for water and sewer access by the poor
cover 25–85 percent (means tested) of a household’s water and sewer bill
for up to 15 cubic meters a month, with the client paying the rest (Gomez-
Lobo 2002). 
Brazil has two noteworthy national minimum standards grant
programs for primary education and health care. Under the 14th
amendment to the federal constitution, state and municipal governments
must contribute 15 percent of their two principal revenue sources (state
value-added tax and state share of the federal revenue-sharing transfers
for states, services tax, and the municipal share of the state revenue-
sharing transfers for municipalities) to the special fund for primary
education (FUNDEF). If the sum of the state and municipal required
contributions divided by the number of primary school students is less
than the national standard, the federal government makes up the
difference. FUNDEF funds are distributed among state and municipal
providers on the basis of school enrollments. 
Fiscal transfers in support of Brazil’s Unified Health System,
which operationalizes the constitutional obligation of the universal right
to free health services, are administered under a federal program called
Annual Budget Ceilings (TGF). The program has two components. Under
the first component, equal per capita financing from the federal
government that pass through states to municipalities is provided to cover
basic health benefits. The second component provides federal financing
for hospital and ambulatory care and all registered health care providers
—state, municipal, and private— are eligible for grant financing through
their municipal government. Under this grant, funding for hospital
admissions and high-cost ambulatory care is subject to a ceiling for each
type of treatment (World Bank, 2001). 
Local governments in the Province of Alberta, Canada, use a novel
approach to determine the allocation of taxpayers’ contribution to school
finance. Resident taxpayers designate the education component of their
property tax bill to either public or parochial (religious, private) school
boards. These declarations determine the total amount of property tax
finance available to public and private providers. Schools receive grants
on a per pupil basis, and parents retain the option to send their children to
a school of their choosing regardless of the designation of school board
on their tax return. This approach encourages competition among schools
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to attract students and explains better performance of government schools
in Alberta and several other provinces that use the same approach.  In the
Province of Ontario, higher education financing assigns weights to
enrollments in different programs, with medical and engineering
education receiving higher weights than the humanities. 
In conclusion, while output-based (performance-oriented) grants
are best suited to grantor’s objectives and are simpler to administer than
traditional input-based conditional transfers, they are rarely practiced.
The reasons have to do with the incentives faced by politicians and
bureaucrats. Such grants empower clients while weakening the sphere for
opportunism and pork barrel politics. The incentives they create
strengthen the accountability of political and bureaucratic elites to
citizens and weaken their ability to peddle influence and build
bureaucratic empires. Their focus on value for money exposes corruption,
inefficiency, and waste. Not surprisingly, this type of grant is blocked by
potential losers. 
Compensating for Benefit Spillovers
Compensating for benefit spillovers is the traditional argument for
providing matching conditional grants. Regional and local governments
will not face the proper incentives to provide the correct levels of services
that yield spillover benefits to residents of other jurisdictions. A system of
open-ended matching grants based on expenditures giving rise to
spillovers will provide the incentive to increase expenditures. Because the
extent of the spillover is usually difficult to measure, the matching rate
will be somewhat arbitrary. 
Although benefit-cost spillover is a serious factor in a number of
countries, such transfers have not been implemented in developing
countries other than South Africa. South Africa provides a closed-ended
matching grant to teaching hospitals based on an estimate of benefit
spillovers associated with enrollment of non-local students and use of
hospital facilities by nonresidents. 
Influencing Local Priorities 
In a federation there is always some degree of conflict among
priorities established by various levels of government. One way to induce
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lower-level governments to follow priorities established by the higher-level
government is for the higher-level government to use its spending power by
providing matching transfers. The higher-level government can provide
open-ended matching transfers with a matching rate that varies inversely
with the recipient’s fiscal capacity. Use of ad hoc grants or open-ended
matching transfers is inadvisable. Ad hoc grants are unlikely to result in
behavioral responses that are consistent with the grantor’s objectives.
Open-ended grants may create budgetary difficulties for the grantor.
India, Malaysia, and Pakistan have conditional closed-ended
matching programs. Pakistan got into serious difficulty in the late 1990s
by offering open-ended matching transfers for provincial tax effort. The
central government had to abandon this program midstream, after it
proved unable to meet its obligations under the program. 
Dealing with Infrastructure Deficiencies and Creating
Macroeconomic Stability in Depressed Regions
Fiscal transfers can be used to serve central government objectives
in regional stabilization. Capital grants are appropriate for this purpose,
provided funds for future upkeep of facilities are available. Capital grants
are also justified to deal with infrastructure deficiencies in poorer
jurisdictions in order to strengthen the common economic union. 
Capital grants are typically determined on project by project basis.
Indonesia took a planning view of such grants in setting a national
minimum standard of access to primary school (within walking distance
of the community served) for the nation as a whole. The central
government provided for school construction, while local governments
provided land for the schools. 
South Africa has experimented with a formula-based capital grant
to deal with infrastructure deficiencies. The Municipal Infrastructure
Grant formula includes a vertical and horizontal division. The vertical
division allocates resources to sectors or other priority areas; the
horizontal division is determined based on a formula that takes account of
poverty, backlogs, and municipal powers and functions. The formula
includes five components:
• Basic residential infrastructure, including new infrastructure and
rehabilitation of existing infrastructure (75 percent weight);
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Proportional allocations are made for water supply and sanitation,
electricity, roads, and “other” (street lighting and solid waste
removal);
• Public municipal service infrastructure, including construction of new
infrastructure and rehabilitation of existing infrastructure (15 percent
weight);
• Social institutions and microenterprises infrastructure (5 percent
weight);
• Nodal municipalities (5 percent weight);
• Final adjustment: A negative (downward adjustment) or positive (top-
up) allocation related to past performance of each municipality
relative to grant conditions. 
Experience with capital grants shows that they often create
facilities that are not maintained by subnational governments, which
either remain unconvinced of their utility or lack the means to provide
regular upkeep. 
Capital grants are pervasive in developing countries and transition
economies. Most countries have complex processes for initiating and
approving submissions for financing capital projects. These processes are
highly susceptible to lobbying, political pressure, and grantsmanship, and
they favor projects that give the central government greater visibility.
Projects typically lack citizen and stakeholder participation, and they
often fail due to lack of local ownership, interest, and oversight. In view
of these difficulties, it may be best to limit the use of capital grants by
requiring matching funds from recipients (varying inversely with the
fiscal capacity of the recipient unit) and by encouraging private sector
participation by providing political and policy risk guarantees. To
facilitate private sector participation, public managers must exercise due
diligence to ensure that the private sector does not take the public sector
for a free ride or walk away from the project midstream.
Special Issues in Transfers from State/Province to Local
Governments
General-purpose transfers to local governments require special
considerations, as local governments vary in population, size, area served,
174 Anwar Shah
and type of services offered. In view of this, it is advisable to classify
local governments by population size, municipality type, and urban/rural
character, creating separate formulas for each class of municipalities. The
higher-level government could adopt a representative tax system–based
fiscal capacity equalization system and set minimum standards grants for
each class and type of municipality. Where the application of a
representative tax system is not feasible due to lack of significant tax
decentralization or poor local tax administration, a more pragmatic but
less scientific approach to general-purpose grants could be used. Some
useful components in these grant formulas are an equal per municipality
component, an equal per capita component, a service area component,
and a fiscal capacity component. Grant funds should vary directly with
the service area and inversely with fiscal capacity (see Shah 1994b on
examples of state-local transfers from Australia, Brazil, and Canada).
South Africa has applied a variant of this approach in central-local
transfers (Box 1.3).
Having a formal open, contestable, and deliberative process for
municipal incorporation, amalgamation, and annexation should be a
prerequisite for introducing an equal per municipality component in grant
finance. The lack of such a process can create a perverse incentive for the
break-up of existing jurisdictions to qualify for additional assistance, as
demonstrated by the experience in Brazil (Shah 1991). 
Box 1.3 South Africa’s Equitable Share Formula for Central-
Local Fiscal Transfers 
South Africa uses an equitable share formula to provide transfers from the
central government to local governments. The size of the grant is
determined as follows: 
Grant = (BS + D + I – R) ± C, 
where BS is the basic services component, D is the development
component, I is the institutional support component, R is the revenue-
raising capacity correction, and C is a correction and stabilization factor.
Basic Services Component
The purpose of the basic services component is to enable municipalities
to provide basic services (water, sanitation, electricity, refuse removal,
175A Practitioner’s Guide to Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers
and other basic services), including free basic services to households
earning less than R800 (about US$111)  a month. (As of April 1, 2006,
environmental health care services have been included as a basic service.)
Since by its nature environmental health is delivered to everyone in a
municipality, this subcomponent is calculated on all households, not only
poor ones. For each subsidized basic service, there are two levels of
support: a full subsidy for households that actually receive services from
the municipality and a partial subsidy for unserviced households,
currently set at one-third of the cost of the subsidy to serviced households.
This component is calculated as follows:
BS = [water subsidy 1 * poor with water + water subsidy 2 * poor
without water] + [sanitation subsidy 1 * poor with sanitation +
sanitation subsidy 2 * poor without sanitation] + [refuse subsidy 1 *
poor with refuse + refuse subsidy 2 * poor without refuse] +[electricity
subsidy 1 * poor with electricity + electricity subsidy 2 * poor without
electricity] + [environmental healthcare subsidy * total number of
households].
Institutional Support Component
The institutional support component is particularly important for poor
municipalities, which are often unable to raise sufficient revenue to fund
the basic costs of administration and governance. Such funding gaps
make it impossible for poor municipalities to provide basic services to all
residents, clients, and businesses. This component supplements the
funding of a municipality for administrative and governance costs. It does
not fully fund all administration and governance costs of a municipality,
which remain the primary responsibility of each municipality.
The institutional component includes two elements: administrative
capacity and local electoral accountability. The grant is determined as
follows: 
I = base allocation + [admin support * population] + [council support *
number of seats]
where the values used in the formula are I = R350,000 + [R1 *
population] + [R36,000 * councillors] 
The “base allocation” is the amount that goes to every municipal structure
(except for a district management area). The second term of this formula
recognizes that costs rise with population. The third term is a contribution
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to the cost of maintaining councillors for the legislative and oversight
role. The number of “seats” that will be recognized for purposes of the
formula is determined by the minister for provincial and local
government.
The Development Component
The development component was set at zero when the current formula
was introduced on April 1, 2005, pending an investigation of how best to
capture the factor in the formula.
The Revenue-Raising Capacity Correction
The revenue-raising capacity correction raises additional resources to
fund the cost of basic services and administrative infrastructure. The basic
approach is to use the relationship between demonstrated revenue-raising
capacity by municipalities that report information and objective
municipal information from Statistics South Africa to proxy revenue-
raising capacity for all municipalities. The revenue that should be
available to a municipality is then “corrected” by imposing a “tax” rate of
5 percent. In the case of the Regional Service Councils levy replacement
grant, the correction is based on the actual grant to each municipality.
Source: South Africa (2006). 
IV.  INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR FISCAL RELATIONS
Who should be responsible for designing the system of federal-
state-local fiscal relations? There are various alternatives (see Shah, 2005
a for an evaluation framework and comparative reflections on alternate
institutional arrangements). The first and most commonly used practice is
for the federal/central government  to decide on it alone.  The most
obvious one is to make the federal government solely responsible, on the
grounds that it is responsible for the national objectives that are to be
delivered through the fiscal arrangements. In many countries, this is the
norm and one or more central government agencies assume exclusive
responsibility for the design and allocation of fiscal transfers. A potential
problem with this approach is the natural tendency of the federal
government to be overly involved with state decisionmaking and not to
allow the full benefits of decentralization to occur. This biases the system
toward a centralized outcome, despite the fact that the grants are intended
to facilitate decentralized decisionmaking. To some extent, this problem
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can be overcome by imposing constitutional restrictions on the ability of
the federal government to override state and local decisions. In China,
central government agencies assume sole responsibility without having
any legislative checks (Shah and Shen, 2006).  In India the federal
government is solely responsible for Planning Commission transfers and
centrally sponsored schemes. These transfers have strong input
conditionality with potential to undermine state and local autonomy. The
1988 Brazilian constitution provides strong safeguards against federal
intrusion by enshrining the transfers’ formula factors in the constitution.
These safeguards represent an extreme step, as they undermine the
flexibility of fiscal arrangements to respond to changing economic
circumstances. 
Alternatively, a separate body could be involved in the design and
ongoing reform and enforcement of fiscal arrangements. This could be an
impartial body or a body made up of both federal and state
representatives. It could have true decision making authority or be purely
advisory. Whatever body is responsible, to be effective, it needs to be able
to coordinate decisionmaking by the two levels of government. Three
commonly practiced options are: (a) and idependent grants commission;
(b) intergovernmental forum; and (c) intergovernmental-cum-civil-
society forum.
Some countries set up a quasi-independent body, such as a grants
commission, to design and reform the fiscal system. Such commissions
can have a permanent presence, as in Australia or South Africa, or they
can be brought into existence periodically to make recommendations for
the next five years, as in India. India has also instituted independent
grants commissions at the state level as advisory bodies for state-local
fiscal transfers.  These commissions have proven ineffective in some
countries, largely because many of their recommendations have been
ignored by the government and not implemented, as in South Africa. In
other cases the government may have accepted and implemented the
commission’s recommendations but been ineffective in reforming the
system due to self-imposed constraints, as in India. In some cases these
commissions become too rigorous and academic in their approaches,
contributing to the creation of an overly complex system of
intergovernmental transfers. This has been the case with the
Commonwealth Grants Commission in Australia. 
A few countries use intergovernmental forums or executive
federalism or federal-provincial committees to negotiate the terms of the
178 Anwar Shah
system, as Canada and Germany do. In Germany this system is enhanced
by having state governments represented in the Bundesrat, the upper
house of the parliament. This system allows for explicit political input
from the jurisdictions involved and attempts to develop a common
consensus. Typically such forums opt for simplicity in design to make the
system transparent and politically acceptable.
Finally, a variant of the above is to use an intergovernmental cum
legislative cum civil society committee with equal representation from all
constituent units, chaired by the federal government to negotiate changes
in existing federal-provincial fiscal arrangements. The Finance
Commission in Pakistan is an example of this model, which is constituted
periodically to determine allocations for the next five years.. Pakistan also
follows the same approach by having province level finance commissions
for designing and allocating provincial-local fiscal transfers. This
approach has the advantage that all stakeholders —donors, recipients,
civil society, and experts— are represented on the commission. Such an
approach keeps the system simple and transparent. An important
disadvantage of this approach is that due to the unanimity rule, such
bodies may be permanently deadlocked, as has recently been witnessed at
the federal level in Pakistan. 
V. LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES
Review of international practices yields a set of practices to avoid
and a set of practices to emulate. A number of important lessons also
emerge (Table 1.7). 
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Table 1.7 
Principles and Better Practices in Grant Design
Source: Author.
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Negative Lessons: Types of Transfers to Avoid
Policymakers should avoid designing the following types of
intergovernmental grants:
1. Grants with vaguely specified objectives;
2. General revenue-sharing programs with multiple factors that work at
cross purposes, and undermine accountability and do not advance
fiscal efficiency or fiscal equity objectives. Tax decentralization or tax-
base sharing offer better alternatives to a general revenue-sharing
program, as they enhance accountability while preserving subnational
autonomy;
3. Grants to finance subnational deficits, which create incentives for
running higher deficits in future;
4. Unconditional grants that include incentives for fiscal effort.
Improving service delivery while lowering tax costs should be
public sector objectives;
5. Input- (or process-) based or ad hoc conditional grant programs,
which undermine local autonomy, flexibility, fiscal efficiency, and
fiscal equity objectives;
6. Capital grants without assurance of funds for future upkeep, which
have the potential to create white elephants;
7. Negotiated or discretionary grants in a federal system, which may
create dissention and disunity;
8. One size fits all grants to local governments, which create huge
inequities;
9. Grants that involve abrupt changes in the total pool and its allocation. 
Positive Lessons: Principles to Adopt
Policymakers should strive to respect the following principles in
designing and implementing intergovernmental transfers:
1. Keep it simple. In the design of fiscal transfers, rough justice may be
better than full justice, if it achieves wider acceptability and
sustainability;
2. Focus on a single objective in a grant program and make the design
consistent with that objective. Setting multiple objectives in a single
grant program runs the risk of failing to achieve any of them;
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3. Introduce ceilings linked with macro indicators and floors, to ensure
stability and predictability in grant funds;
4. Introduce sunset clauses. It is desirable to have the grant program
reviewed periodically —say, every five years— and renewed (if
appropriate). In the intervening years, no changes to the program
should be made, in order to provide certainty in budgetary
programming for all governments;
5. Equalize per capita fiscal capacity to a specified standard in order
to achieve fiscal equalization. Such a standard would determine the
total pool and allocations among recipient units. Calculations
required for fiscal capacity equalization using a representative tax
system for major tax bases are doable for most countries. In
contrast, expenditure need equalization requires difficult and
complex analysis, inviting much controversy and debate; as
desirable as it is, it may not therefore be worth doing. In view of this
practical difficulty, it would be best to deal with fiscal need
equalization through output-based sectoral grants that also enhance
results-based accountability. A national consensus on the standard
of equalization is critically important for the sustainability of any
equalization program. The equalization program must not be looked
at in isolation from the broader fiscal system, especially conditional
transfers. The equalization program must have a sunset clause and
provision for formal review and renewal. For local fiscal
equalization, one size does not fit all; 
6. In specific-purpose grant programs, impose conditionality on
outputs or standards of access and quality of services rather than on
inputs and processes. This allows grantors to achieve their
objectives without undermining local choices on how best to deliver
such services. Most countries need to establish national minimum
standards of basic services across the nation in order to strengthen
the internal common market and economic union; 
7. Recognize population size class, area served, and the urban/rural
nature of services in making grants to local governments. Establish
separate formula allocations for each type of municipal or local
government;
8. Establish hold harmless or grandfathering provisions that ensure
that all recipient governments receive at least what they received as
general-purpose transfers in the pre-reform period. Over time, as
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the economy grows, such a provision would not delay the phase-in
of the full package of reforms;
9. Make sure that all stakeholders are heard and that an appropriate
political compact on equalization principles and the standard of
equalization is struck. Politics must be internalized in these
institutional arrangements. Arms-length institutions, such as
independent grant commissions, are not helpful, as they do not allow
for political input and therefore tend to opt for complex and
nontransparent solutions. 
Moving from a public sector governance culture of dividing the
spoils to an environment that enables responsive, responsible, equitable
and accountable governance is critical. Doing so requires exploring all
feasible tax decentralization options, instituting output-based operating
and capital fiscal transfers, establishing a formal fiscal equalization
program with an explicit standard of equalization, and ensuring
responsible access to borrowing. 
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